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Outside pressure to 
 appreciate the yuan 
could increase China’s 
resistance to reforming 
exchange rate policy and 
financial markets.
T
he U.S. current account deficit has deepened significantly since 
the late 1990s. This shortfall—the value of net exports of goods 
and services, international financial investment net income and transfer 
payments—was $803 billion at its peak in 2006, or 6 percent of U.S. gross 
domestic product (GDP). Conversely, China, Germany, Japan and the oil-
exporting countries have been running current account surpluses that have 
risen substantially (Chart 1). This divergence has raised concerns among 
policymakers, economic researchers and private investors about whether 
these imbalances are sustainable and at what risk to the global economy.
In theory, current account imbalances do not necessarily indicate eco-
nomic danger. If a country is expected to grow more rapidly in the future, 
running  a  current  account  deficit  is  an  optimal  behavior.  The  country 
should borrow now from the rest of the world to finance current consump-
tion and repay the money later when it has greater means. For instance, 
Europe ran a current account deficit while rebuilding after World War II. 
A  large  share  of  the  U.S.  current  account  deficit  before  2005  was 
with other industrial countries, such as Germany and Japan. This behavior 
makes economic sense, argue Charles Engel, a University of Wisconsin–
Madison economics professor, and John Rogers, a Federal Reserve Board 
economist.1 These trade deficits/surpluses simply reflect the difference in 
growth  prospects  between  the  U.S.  and  other  major  industrial  nations. 
Since the mid-1970s, economic expansion in the U.S. has outpaced that of 
other industrial countries. GDP on average grew 2.82 percent in the U.S. 
between 1975 and 2009, compared with 1.87 percent for Germany and 
2.33 percent for Japan. If the U.S. continues to outperform other industrial 
countries, it is optimal to borrow from these nations now and incur a 
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current account deficit. Assuming that 
the difference in economic growth 
between the U.S. and other indus-
trial countries over the past 30 years 
continues for another 20 years, Engel 
and Rogers found that a standard eco-
nomic model could justify a U.S. cur-
rent account deficit at its 2004 level, 
the end of the period covered in their 
research.
Demographic differences also fac-
tor into account imbalances. The pop-
ulations of several industrial countries, 
including Germany and Japan, are 
aging more rapidly than the population 
of the U.S. The need to support future 
retirees provides an incentive for these 
countries to save and incur current 
account surpluses with the U.S. 
The Role of China’s Yuan
Oil-exporting countries and fast-
growing Asian economies, particu-
larly China, began playing an increas-
ingly important role in global current 
account imbalances in 2005. The sub-
stantial increase among oil-exporting 
countries after 2005 is mainly due to 
rising energy prices. China’s current 
account surplus rose to $436.1 billion 
(9.88 percent of GDP) in 2008 from 
$68.7 billion (3.55 percent of GDP) in 
2004, though the genesis of that gain is 
at first glance puzzling. 
Normally, a fast-growing economy 
such as China would borrow money 
from the rest of the world instead of 
lending. An obvious suspect in China’s 
mounting current account surplus is 
the fixed exchange rate between its 
yuan and the dollar. An underval-
ued yuan makes Chinese products 
cheaper than those of competitors 
in international markets. As a result, 
China exports more than it imports. 
According to this explanation, yuan 
appreciation could rebalance the glob-
al economy. This argument has at least 
two flaws. 
First, the durability of the U.S.–
China imbalance is difficult to explain. 
In order for the exchange rate to affect 
import prices, those prices can’t adjust. 
For instance, assume that the People’s 
Bank of China undervalues its currency 
10 percent to make Chinese products 
10 percent cheaper than they other-
wise would be. If Chinese producers 
could change their prices immediately, 
they would increase prices 10 percent 
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to offset the undervaluation. Although 
in reality prices cannot change instant-
ly, they do adjust over the long run; 
therefore, the exchange rate has only 
short-term effects on import prices and 
the current account. China has run a 
significant trade surplus against the 
U.S. for about 10 years (Chart 2). It is 
hard to imagine that prices have not 
fully adjusted to offset the exchange 
rate after such a long period. 
Second, an appreciating yuan may 
only minimally reduce the imbalance. 
Even in the short run, the exchange 
rate’s impact on import prices would 
be quite limited, studies have shown. 
Exporters usually pass on only a frac-
tion of exchange rate movements 
when setting prices. About 20 per-
cent of exchange rate changes were 
reflected in U.S. import prices dur-
ing the past decade, Federal Reserve 
economists Mario Marazzi and Nathan 
Sheets found.2 Profit margins usually 
absorb some of exchange rate move-
ment as exporters seek to maintain 
market share. 
Additionally, the currency under 
which import prices are invoiced also 
affects the exchange rate pass-through. 
Most U.S. imports from China are 
priced in dollars, and their prices are 
fixed in the short run. In this case, 
depreciation of the dollar against the 
yuan has no short-run effect on import 
prices from China.
 
Effect of Structural Distortion
Rather than an undervalued cur-
rency, China’s ballooning current 
account surplus may reflect deeper 
structural distortions in its economy. 
Chart 2 shows that China’s total trade 
account balance began to move up in 
2005, though the bilateral trade surplus 
with the U.S. began much earlier.
High household savings is a 
suspected cause of China’s massive 
current account surplus. However, 
corporate and government savings 
have played a more important role 
(Chart 3). The amount of household 
savings as a percentage of dispos-
able income has been stable since the 
1990s, although the savings rate is high 
relative to that of industrial countries. 
Corporate and government savings 
have increased substantially compared 
with the household rate since 2004—
when the current account surplus 
began expanding. 
The corporate and government 
savings increases were accompanied 
by a shift in the composition of state-
owned enterprises. During this period, 
state-owned corporations exited from 
industries with low profit margins, such 
as textiles. Meanwhile, state-owned 
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corporations continue to dominate 
and crowd out private companies in 
industries with higher margins, such as 
finance, energy, telecommunications, 
transportation and real estate. This 
leadership of state-owned corporations 
is not a result of market-based compe-
tition. Instead, it is a product of favor-
able government treatment, including 
easy access to credit and advantageous 
loan terms from state-owned banks. 
The government also erected policy 
barriers to prevent private entry into 
these industries. 
The booming global economy 
around 2005 boosted China’s corporate 
profits. Earnings in the high-margin 
industries were transformed into sav-
ings because the government lacked 
channels to redistribute them for 
household consumption. In the long 
run, this structural economic distortion 
should be corrected to balance China’s 
current account surplus. Financial-
sector reform and removal of entry 
barriers in industries dominated by 
state enterprises will decrease the cor-
porate savings rate. Authorities should 
also increase competition in these now 
highly regulated industries, promoting 
efficiency and economic growth in the 
long run.
 
Steps to Balance Economy
In the shorter term, boosting gov-
ernment spending on the social safety 
net may effectively reduce China’s cur-
rent account surplus. Increasing such 
expenditures not only can directly 
decrease government savings but also 
reduce overall household savings 
through shared risk. 
The Chinese government has offi-
cially acknowledged a need to balance 
its economy, listing increased domestic 
spending as one of the most impor-
tant issues in its 12th Five-Year Plan 
(2011–15). Yi Gang, deputy governor 
of the People’s Bank of China, said 
in October that China would reduce 
its current account surplus to less 
than 4 percent of GDP within three to 
five years—a target proposed by U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner.3 
China also recently passed the Social 
Insurance Law, laying the foundations 
for its social safety net. Social welfare 
programs such as retirement, basic 
health care and unemployment insur-
ance coverage will be created. Such 
programs have been difficult to estab-
lish in China in the past.
Structural changes will require 
time to implement, and the current 
account imbalance between China 
and the U.S. may continue. Policies 
attempting a quick fix may produce 
unintended consequences. Outside 
pressure to appreciate the yuan could 
increase China’s resistance to reform-
ing exchange rate policy and financial 
markets—both crucial to addressing 
this massive country’s structural  
economic issues. 
Wang is a senior research economist in the 
Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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